HLnovel 021 Multiple Interpretations of a Relationship
021 Multiple Interpretations of a Relationship
Zhen Xiaosi opened the "Biography of An Lushan" in the Old Book of Tang, a passage she had read countless times:
"An Lushan was a mixed-race Hu (non-Han) from Liucheng, Yingzhou... In the twentieth year, Zhang Shougui was the military governor of Youzhou. When An Lushan was caught stealing sheep, Shougui was about to beat him to death with a stick. An Lushan shouted, 'Does the general not want to destroy the Xi and Khitan tribes? Why kill a brave man?' Shougui was amazed by his words and appearance, so he released him and kept him at the front of the army to serve. He and Shi Siming were then appointed as generals for capturing prisoners. An Lushan was familiar with mountains, rivers, wells, and springs. He once captured dozens of Khitans alive with only three or five riders under his command. Shougui was even more impressed by him, increased his troops, and then raised him as his son."
A Multidimensional Analysis of Adoption Relationships (Zhen Xiaosi's Notes):
This record needs to be analyzed in layers:
1) Factual level: An Lushan faced the death penalty for stealing sheep, but Zhang Shougui pardoned him and appointed him based on his appearance and demeanor; 2) Relational level: From "capturing a live general" to "raising him as a son," a quasi-blood relationship was formed; 3) Functional level: An Lushan's military talents (familiarity with terrain, skill in capturing prisoners) had practical value for frontier defense; 4) Symbolic level: The adoption of a non-Han general by a Han general reflects a certain degree of ethnic integration in Tang Dynasty frontier society (although this was later reversed).
From a psychological perspective, Zhen Xiaosi attempts to reconstruct Zhang Shougui's decision-making process:
Why did Zhang Shougui change his mind when faced with a barbarian sheep thief about to be executed? First, the slogan of "annihilating the Xi and Khitan" resonated with Zhang Shougui's core responsibility as a frontier commander—pacifying the two barbarian tribes was a key performance indicator for gaining the court's approval. Second, An Lushan's "tall and imposing physique and bold and decisive speech" matched the Tang Dynasty's aesthetic and imagination of "strong men." On a deeper level, in the high-mortality environment of frontier military towns, "adopting brave and strong men as sons" was a common interpersonal strategy: both expanding one's trusted forces and establishing stronger bonds of loyalty through the sham bloodline.
However, Zhen Xiaosi also noted another side of the problem: "This adoption relationship is essentially instrumental. Zhang Shougui needed a 'barbarian general' like An Lushan to carry out high-risk missions (capturing animals, reconnaissance, and raids), while An Lushan needed Zhang Shougui's protection to obtain legitimate status and a path to promotion. It was a mutually beneficial exchange relationship, but it was packaged as a 'father-son' ethic. When An Lushan's power later surpassed Zhang Shougui's, the fragility of this quasi-blood relationship was exposed—historical records do not show how much contact Zhang Shougui had with An Lushan in his later years, and it is very likely that the relationship had long since become a mere formality."
Sociological theory of "social networks" offers another perspective: by adopting An Lushan, Zhang Shougui effectively planted a key node in the Han-barbarian network of the Youzhou military garrison. An Lushan, as a "mixed-barbarian" figure, could communicate with both Han military generals and barbarian forces; this "boundary-spanner" position could have strengthened Zhang Shougui's control over frontier society. However, network nodes can also backfire—once An Lushan accumulated sufficient resources, he used this position to build his own power network, ultimately breaking away from and even betraying his adoptive father.
“The most ironic thing is,” Zhen Xiaosi wrote, “that Zhang Shougui’s epitaph makes no mention of An Lushan. This may be a deliberate avoidance by the author, Daxi Xun (after all, An had already rebelled against the Tang Dynasty when the epitaph was written), but it also reflects the awkward position of this relationship in Zhang Shougui’s life: an important fact that could not be included in the ‘narrative of meritorious officials’.”
Da Xi Xun, a scholar-official who was later executed for surrendering to the An Lushan rebels, wrote Zhang Shougui's epitaph in the 28th year of the Kaiyuan era (740). Zhen Xiaosi compared the epitaph text with the two Tang Histories word by word and discovered many intriguing details.
Correction of the chronological order of official titles:
The epitaph records Zhang Shougui's official career progression in great detail: "Resigned as a junior officer in Pingluo Prefecture → transferred to Right Valiant Guard Assistant General → appointed Prefect of Guazhou and Military Commissioner of Moli → appointed Governor of Guazhou Prefecture → transferred Governor of Shanzhou and Military Commissioner of Longyou → transferred to Prefect of Youzhou, Governor of Yingzhou, and Deputy Military Commissioner of Hebei → appointed Vice Censor-in-Chief → appointed Grand General of the State and Right General of the Feathered Forest Guard..."
"Comparing his biography in the Old Book of Tang," Zhen Xiaosi noted, "the historical record places the title of 'Associate Censor-in-Chief' in the 21st year of the Kaiyuan era, but the epitaph shows that it was given after defeating the Khitan while serving in Youzhou, which should be at the end of the 22nd year. These subtle differences are important because they relate to the pace of Zhang Shougui's political capital accumulation—the promotions he received after each victory reflected the court's real-time feedback on his achievements."
The mystery of his retirement and year of death:
According to both Tang Histories, Zhang Shougui was demoted to Prefect of Kuozhou for concealing the defeat of his subordinates, and later died of a carbuncle on his back. His epitaph provides more details: "He requested to retire due to illness, and was granted the privilege of retiring by imperial decree... He died on the 24th day of the second month of the 28th year of the Kaiyuan era at his private residence in Luoyang at the age of 67."
Zhen Xiaosi analyzed: "'Resigning due to illness' may be a polite way of putting it, but in reality it should be a forced retirement after political setbacks. However, the epitaph insists on the narrative of 'meritorious officials dying peacefully,' emphasizing the court's 'favorable edict' and the peaceful death in the private residence in Luoyang. This reflects the discourse characteristics of the epitaph genre: it is not only a record of facts, but also a text that shapes the social evaluation of the deceased."
The political signal of posthumous titles:
The epitaph records Zhang Shougui's posthumous title as "so-and-so," but this part is missing from the rubbing. Zhen Xiaosi consulted other historical materials and found that a Song Dynasty encyclopedia quoted the *Tang Huiyao* as saying Zhang Shougui's posthumous title was "Wulie" (武烈). If true, this posthumous title is very meaningful: "Wu" (武) affirms his military achievements, and "Lie" (烈) usually implies "meritorious service in pacifying the people" and "upholding virtue and following one's profession," making it an overall honorific title. This shows that although Zhang Shougui had the stain of "concealing defeat and turning it into merit" in his later years, the court ultimately gave him a positive evaluation.
“The key lies in timing,” Zhen Xiaosi pondered. “In the twenty-eighth year of the Kaiyuan era, An Lushan had already been appointed as the military commissioner of Pinglu, but he had not yet shown any signs of rebellion. The court’s evaluation of Zhang Shougui may not have been affected by the later An Lushan Rebellion. If the epitaph had been written ten years later, it probably wouldn’t have been worded like this.”
In the twenty-sixth year of the Kaiyuan era (738), Zhao Kan and Bai Zhentuo, generals of Youzhou, falsely claimed to be acting on the orders of Zhang Shougui, forcing Wu Zhiyi, the military commissioner of Pinglu, to send troops to attack the Xi. They initially won but were later defeated. Zhang Shougui "concealed the details of their defeat and falsely reported a victory." After the affair was exposed, Emperor Xuanzong sent the eunuch Niu Xiantong to investigate. Zhang Shougui heavily bribed Xiantong, pinned the blame on Bai Zhentuo, and forced him to commit suicide. Ultimately, Niu Xiantong's bribery was also exposed, and Zhang Shougui was demoted to the position of prefect of Kuozhou.
Cognitive dissonance and moral decline (Zhen Xiaosi's Notes):
“Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance can partially explain Zhang Shougui’s behavior: He held a long-standing self-perception of ‘I am a successful border general.’ When the defeats of his subordinates threatened this perception, he chose to deny and cover up the facts (concealing defeats), or even construct counterfactuals (falsely reporting victories) to reduce psychological discomfort. This mechanism is common among those in power: the more successful they have been in the past, the harder it is for them to accept failure.”
However, Zhen Xiaosi believes that psychological explanations alone are insufficient and must be combined with the institutional environment:
"The reward and punishment mechanism for frontier defense in the Tang Dynasty contained structural contradictions. On the one hand, the court required military governors to 'defeat the enemy and achieve victory'; on the other hand, occasional defeats were inevitable. However, the bureaucratic system often lacked tolerance for failure, and a single defeat could lead to the loss of all previous achievements. This risk prompted frontier generals to tend to conceal unfavorable information. Zhang Shougui was not an exception—Wang Junyi, Gai Jiayun, and others of the same period exhibited similar behaviors. This is an ethical dilemma induced by the system."
At a deeper level is the change in Zhang Shougui's personal circumstances: "By the end of the Kaiyuan era, Zhang Shougui was over sixty years old, and his health may have been compromised (the 'carbuncle on the back' may have been an early sign). He had accumulated a lifetime of fame and status, and was facing old age and retirement. At this stage of life, people are often more anxious about maintaining their existing achievements and more sensitive to threats. From Erikson's psychosocial developmental stages, he was in a crisis of 'perfection vs. despair': if he could not maintain the perfection of his achievements, he might fall into despair about the meaning of life."
Zhen Xiaosi found scattered records about Zhang Shougui after his demotion: "After arriving in Kuozhou, he seems to have never held office again. He soon retired due to illness and returned to Luoyang. This was the sad exit of a general. The epitaph attempts to beautify this ending, but it cannot hide the sadness in it: a general who once dominated the northwestern desert and the northeastern mountains and forests, finally died of carbuncles in his residence in the eastern capital of the empire."
Zhen Xiaosi hung two maps on the wall of the study: one was the Hexi Corridor, marked with Guazhou, Shazhou, and Suzhou; the other was Hebei Road, marked with Youzhou, Yingzhou, and Nalu Mountain.
From a spatial sociology perspective: "Zhang Shougui's military career spanned two war zones with vastly different geography and culture, which shaped his multidimensional military talents."
Characteristics of Guazhou (Northwest):
Geographical environment: deserts, Gobi, oases; cities are scarce defensive nodes.
Characteristics of the opponent: Tibet was a well-organized imperial opponent, and tactically adept at using cavalry raids.
Combat modes: focusing on city defense and attack, water source control, and supply line protection.
Zhang Shougui's adaptation: He developed a combination of "fortified cities + surprise attacks" tactics and emphasized logistical construction (military agricultural settlements).
Characteristics of Youzhou (Northeast):
Geographical environment: Yanshan Mountains, hills, grasslands, providing greater mobility.
Opponent characteristics: The Khitan and Xi are a tribal alliance, prone to defection, and skilled in mountain guerrilla warfare.
Operational mode: requires intelligence warfare, political division, and rapid mobile strikes.
Zhang Shougui's adaptations: employing divisive tactics and cultivating barbarian generals (such as An Lushan) for special operations.
"Interestingly," Zhen Xiaosi wrote, "Zhang Shougui seems to have accomplished a kind of capability transfer: the psychological warfare of 'combining reality and illusion' (the Empty City Stratagem) cultivated in Guazhou was transformed into the feigned surrender and sowing discord among the Khitans in Youzhou; the experience of military farming accumulated in the Northwest may also have been applied to the production of military grain in Yingzhou. This reflects a high-level military learning ability."
However, his experiences in both places also sowed the seeds of Zhang Shougui's limitations: "In Guazhou, he faced the external enemy, the Tubo, and the internal situation was relatively simple; in Youzhou, he had to deal with the complex relationship between the Tubo and Han peoples and the network of interests among the military generals. His failure (concealing his defeat) occurred precisely in the more complex political ecology of Youzhou. Perhaps it can be said that he was good at dealing with clear military threats, but not necessarily proficient in the dark political games."
It was late at night, and Zhen Xiaosi was the only one left in the research room. She was organizing her research notes from the past few months, preparing to write the conclusion of her paper. In her mind, Zhang Shougui was no longer the flat record in history books, but a complex figure full of tension.
The Position of Historical Sociology:
"Zhang Shougui is a typical representative of the frontier military elite of the Tang Dynasty. He rose to prominence during the transition period between the disintegration of the Fubing system and the formation of the Jiedushi system. His success relied on: 1) the initial capital of a military family; 2) his personal military talent; 3) the court's emphasis on the effectiveness of frontier operations; and 4) his presence at the right time and place (the crisis in Guazhou). However, he also embodied the inherent contradictions of this group: they had to maintain a performance of loyalty to the court while accumulating de facto autonomy on the frontier; they had to rely on the military capabilities of the barbarian generals while preventing them from becoming too powerful and out of control."
Psychological portrait:
"From a holistic developmental perspective, Zhang Shougui exhibits clear stage characteristics: his youth was marked by ambition and military achievements (the Guazhou Miracle); his middle age saw him reach the pinnacle of power, but he began to face more complex challenges (the politics of Youzhou); and his old age was marked by declining health and political mistakes, leading to his downfall. His decision-making pattern shows that in his early years he relied more on rational calculation (the systematic nature of the Guazhou defense), while in his later years he was more influenced by emotions and cognitive biases (the irrationality of concealing defeats). His adoption of An Lushan was a mixture of rational judgment (An's abilities were useful) and intuitive impulse (appreciating his 'heroic' spirit)."
A Reassessment of Relations with An Lushan:
"This relationship cannot be simply attributed to 'Zhang Shougui raising a tiger that will cause trouble.' In the context of the mid-Kaiyuan period, adopting brave and strong barbarians would have been a common frontier strategy."
The problem lies in the following: 1) The Tang Dynasty's frontier control system failed to effectively absorb and tame ambitious figures like An Lushan; 2) Later policies of the court (such as Li Linfu's appointment of non-Han generals as military governors) created an institutional channel for An Lushan's rise; 3) Zhang Shougui's personal influence over An Lushan may have lacked sustained impact (factors such as age, health, and demotion). Therefore, attributing the An Lushan Rebellion solely to Zhang Shougui is unfair—he was merely an early link in a longer causal chain.
The historical value of the epitaph text: "The epitaph written by Da Xixun provides us with resources on three levels:
1) Factual Correction Layer: Details regarding the chronology of official positions can fill gaps in historical records; 2) Discourse Analysis Layer: The epitaph's avoidance of sensitive issues (omitting An Lushan) and its glorification of his shortcomings (stating "retired due to illness") reveal the official narrative strategy of the late Kaiyuan era; 3) Emotional Structure Layer: The epitaph's praise for "border achievements" and emphasis on "a peaceful death" reflect the values of the Tang Dynasty elite. This epitaph is not only about Zhang Shougui, but also about that era.
Zhen Xiaosi wrote the following last words:
"Zhang Shougui's life is like a mirror, reflecting the glory and fragility of the Tang Dynasty's frontier. He built cities, dug canals, defeated foreign enemies, and adopted barbarian generals. All these actions strengthened the empire's defenses in the short term. But in the long run, these measures also contributed to the reshaping of the frontier's power structure: the monopolization of power by military governors, the rise of barbarian generals, and information asymmetry between the central government and the periphery... Ultimately, these structural problems erupted during the An Lushan Rebellion."
“Studying Zhang Shougui is not about praising or criticizing a historical figure, but about understanding how a system, in its pursuit of stability, unknowingly accumulates factors of instability. This is the paradox of history and the eternal dilemma of human governance.”
"In the dead of night, I seem to see Luoyang in the twenty-eighth year of the Kaiyuan era, an old general with carbuncles on his back tossing and turning on his sickbed. Does he recall the banquet on the walls of Guazhou, the beacon fires in the mountains of Youzhou? Does he recall the young barbarian he rescued from torture? History does not tell us. We only know that four years after his death, An Lushan was appointed as the military governor of Pinglu; and fifteen years later, the drums of war from Yuyang shook the earth, and the glorious Tang Dynasty came to an abrupt end."
"Zhang Shougui's epitaph lies quietly in Beiman Mountain, the characters gradually fading. But the choices engraved in stone and the connections buried by time still surge in the undercurrents of history, waiting to be reinterpreted."
Zhen Xiaosi saved the document and shut down the computer. The rain outside the window had stopped, and the east was beginning to lighten with the first light of dawn. She tidied up the rubbings, photocopies, and notes, and locked the door to her research room. The motion-activated lights in the corridor turned on and off one by one.
At the corner of the stairs, she paused for a moment and looked back at the tightly closed door. Inside were not only biographical records of a Tang Dynasty border general, but also the code of an era, a complex narrative about power, loyalty, ambition, and oblivion.